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Structural positions and risk budgeting
Quantifying the impact of structural positions and
deriving implications for active portfolio management
Ulf Herold*2
ABSTRACT
Structural positions are very common in investment practice. A structural position is defined
as a permanent overweighting of a riskier asset class relative to a prespecified benchmark
portfolio. The most prominent example for a structural position is the equity bias in a
balanced fund that arises by consistently overweighting equities in tactical asset allocation.
Another example is the permanent allocation of credit in a fixed income portfolio with a
government benchmark.
The analysis provided in this article shows that whenever possible, structural positions should
be avoided. Graphical illustrations based on Pythagorean theorem are used to make a
connection between the active risk/return and the total risk/return framework. Structural
positions alter the risk profile of the portfolio substantially, and the appeal of active
management – to provide active returns uncorrelated to benchmark returns and hence to shift
the efficient frontier outwards – gets lost. The article demonstrates that the commonly used
alpha – tracking error criterion is not sufficient for active management. In addition, structural
positions complicate measuring managers’ skill.
The paper also develops normative implications for active portfolio management. Tactical
asset allocation should be based on the comparison of expected excess returns of an asset
class to the equilibrium risk premium of the same asset class and not to expected excess
returns of other asset classes. For the cases, where structural positions cannot be avoided, a
risk budgeting approach is introduced and applied to determine the optimal position size.
Finally, investors are advised not to base performance evaluation only on simple manager
rankings because this encourages managers to take structural positions and does not reward
efforts to produce alpha. The same holds true for comparing managers’ information ratios.
Information ratios, in investment practice defined as the ratio of active return to active risk, do
not uncover structural positions.
Keywords: active management; structural positions; information ratios; Pythagorean
theorem; risk budgeting; tactical asset allocation
JEL classification: G113
 Introduction
In asset management, it is common practice to employ a two-stage procedure. The investor
determines the strategic asset allocation (in a way to match his liabilities as good as possible)
and thereby derives a benchmark which reflects this strategic positioning. The active portfolio
manager manages the fund against this benchmark.
1 The investor bears the risk of the
strategic asset allocation, the portfolio manager is (only) responsible for the active risk he
takes.
2 Both take two different points of view: the investor has a total return/total risk
perspective, while the active manager moves within in an active return/active risk framework.
There has been a long debate about this “artificial” separation and whether the alpha –
tracking error criterion is sufficient for portfolio construction and performance evaluation in
active portfolio management. In his well-known article, Roll (1992) addresses the issue that
market indices, which serve as a proxy for the clients’ benchmarks, are usually not efficient.
3
The portfolio manager could improve on the Sharpe ratio by constructing a portfolio with the
same total risk as the benchmark but a higher expected return by moving upwards from the
benchmark portfolio to the efficient frontier.
4 However, the alpha – tracking error criterion
prevents him from doing so.
One shortcoming of the alpha – tracking error criterion is that the focus is on active risk only.
This becomes a severe problem when the portfolio manager implements structural positions.
The most prominent example for a structural position is the equity bias in a balanced fund
induced by consistently overweighting equities (or, by overweighting equities more often than
underweighting equities) in tactical asset allocation (TAA). Another example is the permanent
allocation of credit in a fixed income portfolio with a government benchmark. Generally, a
structural position can be defined as a permanent overweighting of a riskier asset class
relative to a prespecified benchmark portfolio. This leads to a new reference point (e.g., a
20% exposure to credit or a 5% overweight in equities), from which the manager tactically
deviates.
                                        
1  In this paper, the focus is on active management. Of course, the investor could also decide to employ a
passive manager with the task to replicate the benchmark return.
2  The strategic asset allocation regularly accounts for over 90% of the total fund risk, as shown for example in
Brinson et al. (1991).
3  If they were efficient, there would be no justification for active management, and investors will invest only in
passive funds.4
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the impact of structural positions on the fund’s total
risk characteristics and to develop normative implications for portfolio management. The
analysis provided in this article shows that whenever possible, structural positions should be
avoided. The main reason is that structural positions dominate portfolio return and portfolio
risk. They alter the portfolio’s risk profile substantially and (usually) in a negative fashion
from the investor’s total risk/return perspective. The appeal of active management - to provide
alpha, i.e. excess return uncorrelated to the benchmark return and hence to shift the efficient
frontier outwards – gets lost. In addition, structural positions complicate measuring managers’
skill.
To avoid structural positions, the investor can either amend the alpha – tracking error criterion
by imposing an additional restriction on the fund’s total risk, or he can demand from the
manager to construct active portfolios that are orthogonal to the benchmark portfolio. The
investment manager can avoid structural positions by altering his investment process for TAA
decisions. He should compare his expected excess return forecast of an asset class with the
equilibrium risk premium of that same asset class and not with expected excess return
forecasts of other asset classes to derive active positions.
However in some cases, a structural position cannot be avoided. For instance, when the
investor wants to partially shift from government bonds into corporate bonds, it would be
necessary to replace the government bond benchmark by a broad benchmark. However, this
might not be feasible because of lacking liquidity in the corporate segment or because of an
insufficient portfolio size. The only way for the investor to get some exposure to credit is by
allowing the manager to implement a structural position. It is crucial then to determine the
optimal position size for this position. This can be done by using risk budgeting techniques.
After quantifying the information ratio for a structural position, the appropriate active risk
budget can be determined.
For performance evaluation, investors are advised not to compare managers according to their
achieved active return only, because this encourages managers to take structural positions and
does not reward efforts to produce alpha. Recently, investors have begun to base performance
evaluation also on information ratios. However, information ratios, in investment practice
                                                                                                                              
4  In this article, risk is defined as standard deviation, according to Markowitz (1959).5
defined as ratio of active return to active risk, do not uncover structural positions and
therefore are prone to not measure managers’ skill correctly.
This paper is organized as follows. In section one, we illustrate the implementation of a
structural position using the case study of a balanced fund. We quantify the impact on total
risk by making a connection between the active risk/active return and the total risk/total return
framework. This is done by mathematical expressions as well as graphical illustrations using
Pythagorean theorem. Section one also explores and discusses the underlying theoretical
foundations of structural positions. Section two develops implications for active portfolio
management. We show how TAA investment processes could be altered in order to avoid
structural positions. For the cases that structural positions cannot be avoided, we derive the
position sizes of structural positions using a risk budgeting approach. The last section
summarizes implications for performance evaluation.
 I. Quantifying the impact of structural positions
In this section, we illustrate the impact of structural positions on total fund’s risk and return
characteristics by using mathematical expressions as well as Pythagorean theorem for
triangles. In the first part, we briefly review Pythagorean theorem and show how it can be
applied for illustration of risk. Next, we explain that structural positions lead to structural
information ratios and compare them to real information ratios. Finally, we discuss the
underlying theoretical foundation of structural positions.
1. Using triangles for risk analysis
According to Pythagorean theorem, the squared length of the hypotenuse equals the sum of
the squared lengths of both cathetes in a right angled triangle, or 
2 2 2 b a c + = . In every
triangle, the square of a triangle side c is equal to the sum of the squares of the sides a and b,
less the double product of the sides and the cosine of the angle δ (see figure 1). In algebraic
terms,
[1]  δ − + = cos ab 2 b a c
2 2 2 .6
Figure 1
When comparing this equation to the equation for portfolio variance in the two asset case,
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where  i h  denotes the weight of asset i,  i σ  denotes standard deviation of asset i, and  12 ρ  is the
correlation coefficient between the two assets, the analogy becomes clear by setting  1 1 h a σ = ,
2 2 h b σ = , and  ) arccos( 12 ρ − = δ . Portfolio risk and different kinds of risk decomposition can
be illustrated by triangles.
For instance, the impact of a varying correlation coefficient on the risk of a portfolio investing
in two asset classes is demonstrated in figure 2. A portfolio is invested 25% in equities and
75% in bonds. The volatilities of equities and bonds are 20% and 4%, respectively. The
varying correlation between equities and bonds corresponds to a varying angle. The portfolio
moves on a circle with radius 3. If the correlation is 1, portfolio volatility is 8% (the sum of
the weighted standard deviations). If the asset classes are uncorrelated, the angle is 90%, and
portfolio volatility is 5.8%. No calculator is necessary, just a ruler.
Figure 2
Another application is risk decomposition of the tracking error. The tracking error is a widely
used expression for active risk. It measures the dispersion (volatility) of active returns around
c
a
b
δ
σP = 5.83
h1σ1 = 5
h2σ2 = 37
the mean active return. It consists of a systematic and a residual part. By dropping the
perpendicular (see figure  3), the tracking error  P ψ  is decomposed into its systematic
component,  B PAσ β , and its residual component,  P ω :
[3] 
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P
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P
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P ω + σ β = ψ ,
where  PA β  is the portfolio’s active beta and is defined as portfolio beta with the respect to the
benchmark,  P β , minus one.
Figure 3
Figure 4 quantifies the risk contribution of active management on total risk. If active risk
comprises only residual risk, the active portfolio is orthogonal to the benchmark portfolio.
Total portfolio risk,  P σ  (the line between PF and Cash), is only marginally higher than total
benchmark risk,  B σ  (the line between Cash and BM). For example, a balanced benchmark
(stocks and bonds) might have a volatility of 12%. Then a tracking error of 2% leads to a
portfolio risk of 12.17%. Hence figure 4 illustrates the appeal of active management in a
graphical way: Active management produces orthogonal returns from which the investor fully
benefits, while his risk profile is not altered substantially.
Figure 4
2. Real versus structural information ratios – A case study
Consider an investor who is invested in a balanced fund. The benchmark consists of 40%
equities and 60% bonds. Volatilities σ and expected excess returns f  ( expected total returns
Cash BM
PF
ωP=2%
σP=12.17%
σB=12%
Cash
BM
PF
ψP ωP
βPAσB8
over the risk-free rate) are shown in figure 5. The correlation between equities and bonds is
assumed to be 0.2.
Figure 5
This portfolio structure leads to an expected portfolio excess returns of 290bp for the investor.
Portfolio volatility is 8.8%, the (expected) Sharpe ratio,  P P f σ , equals 0.33. The investor
wishes (or requires) a 50bp higher return. He asks an active manager to fulfill this task. The
active manager can choose between two extreme positions (and any combinations, but we
only consider the extreme cases in this section): he can either overweight equities, the asset
class with higher expected excess returns, so much that expected portfolio excess return
increases by 50bp, without deviating from the benchmarks within the asset classes. Or he can
do security selection within bonds and within equities in order to generate an alpha of 50bp
but without shifting from bonds to equities. The first strategy is referred to as structural (as
defined above): permanently overweighting the riskier asset class. We call the second way
“real” active management.
The structural position will lead to an increased return of 50bp, when overweighting equities
by 14%. The active risk following from this decision amounts to 280bp.
5 This results in an
information ratio of 0.18. This information ratio is of structural nature because it simply
results from shifting the asset classes.
Suppose the manager has a real information ratio (i.e., an information ratio based on selection
skills) of equal size. Then he can generate an alpha of 50bp with an equal size of active risk.
So far both strategies lead to the same result. The difference becomes clear when leaving the
active return/active risk space. With the first strategy (structural position), portfolio total risk
substantially increases from 8.8% to 11.3%. The Sharpe ratio declines from 0.33 to 0.30. In
contrast, the second strategy achieves the same increase in return with only marginally rising
portfolio volatility to 9.2%, and the Sharpe ratio climbs to 0.37.
                                        
5  Tracking error is calculated by substituting the vector of active weights, hPA, into the standard deviation
equation, (hP’VhP)
0.5, where V is the (full) covariance matrix.
hB σ f
EQ 0.4 20% 5.0%
FI 0.6 4% 1.5%9
Both strategies can be compared using the graphical tools introduced above. In figure 6, the
portfolio resulting from the real active management strategy, denoted by PF
r, is orthogonal to
the benchmark portfolio, because it is uncorrelated to the benchmark portfolio. The structural
portfolio, PF
s, however, lies on the right side of the circle. (The circle comprises all active
portfolios with a tracking error of 280bp.) The angle δ can be determined by using a similar
formula for the breakdown of risk as shown in figure 3 above. From
[4]  P B B , PA
2
P
2
B
2
P 2 ψ σ ρ + ψ + σ = σ ,
it follows a correlation coefficient,  B , PA ρ , of 0.89 between the active structural portfolio and
the benchmark portfolio. This very high correlation translates into an angle of 153°.
Figure 6
The distances between the points corresponding to cash and the two portfolios represent
portfolio volatility. The volatility of the structural portfolio is much higher as it lies on the
very right – a disadvantageous situation for the investor. The reason for this is that the
structural portfolio has a beta of (much) greater than one. In our case study, using
2
B B) Vh ( σ = β , where V  denotes the covariance matrix and  B h  is the vector of benchmark
weights, yields a beta of 2.19 for stocks and a beta of 0.21 for bonds. This gives a beta
coefficient of 1.28 for the structural portfolio. Using [3], it follows that about 80% of the
tracking error variance of (280bp)
2 is systematic.
There are different qualities of active return and active risk. A real active return, or alpha, is
orthogonal to the benchmark return. Whatever the performance of the benchmark in a certain
period, the alpha will stay the same (in the example, 50bp p.a.). In contrast, the structural
active return is linked to a pretty high extent to the (direction and magnitude of the)
benchmark return. Analogously, real active risk, or residual risk, has only a little effect on
total risk, whereas structural active risk increases it substantially.
PFs
Cash BM
PFr
δ10
The severe problem with the alpha – tracking error criterion is that it fails to consider the
impact of active management on the client portfolio’s level of total risk. It is located in the
active risk/active return framework and does not allow any conclusions about total risk. Total
risk, however, is the relevant measure for the investor. Active management can increase total
risk by a great amount when implementing structural positions.
To summarize: A structural position leads to a structural information ratio. An investor will
prefer a “real” information ratio to a structural information ratio when both are of equal size.
The “real” information ratio arises from active positions which are uncorrelated to the
benchmark portfolio so that total risk is only marginally increased. Structural positions lead to
active portfolios which are highly correlated to the benchmark portfolio so that total risk is
significantly increased.
6
To avoid structural positions, the investor can either amend the alpha – tracking error criterion
by imposing a constraint on the fund’s total risk. Graphically, this constraint would be
represented by a circle around the cash point. The manager’s portfolio must lie within this
circle. Or he can require that the active portfolio is orthogonal to the benchmark portfolio by
imposing a beta constraint. However, this would prevent the manager from doing tactical
asset allocation, which is an important source of value added in balanced funds. In section
two, we will therefore discuss how the investment process could be changed in order to allow
for tactical asset allocation but to avoid structural positions at the same time.
In addition to changing the fund’s risk profile, structural positions complicate measuring
manager’s skill. It is difficult to disentangle the performance effect of structural positions
from manager’s skill. In the credit example from above, investors and managers will prefer
broad fixed income benchmarks instead of gaining exposure to credit through structural off-
benchmark positions: investors, because they can then better monitor the manager’s
performance, and managers, because they can demonstrate their value added more clearly.
When managers are restricted to off-benchmark positions, they can only go long. Short selling
is typically not permitted. This causes credit allocation to become an asymmetric decision
(i.e., the manager can only implement bullish views), which lowers information ratio.
                                        
6  Structural positions will only reduce total risk, if the benchmark is located on the (inefficient) portion of the
efficient frontier below the minimum variance portfolio. However, an investor will not choose an (ex ante)
inefficient benchmark portfolio.11
3. The underlying theoretical foundations
An investor who believes that it is possible to beat the market and who has the skill to select
good managers (with information ratios greater than zero before expenses) will invest in
active funds.
7 He will allow (or even urge) the manager to take residual risk to achieve alpha,
although according to capital market theory, residual risk can be diversified and therefore
offers no risk premium.
A portfolio manager implementing only structural positions assumes that the efficient market
hypothesis (EMH) holds,
8 and following CAPM and APT, he will not take any residual risk
but simply shift into riskier assets to capture the higher risk premium associated with these
assets.
The information ratio is usually employed to compare different managers or different
strategies. The problem, however, is that in investment practice, the (expected) information
ratio is regularly defined as expected active return divided by active risk ( P PA f ψ ), whereas
the correct definition, given in the literature, is alpha divided by residual risk ( P P ω α ).
9
Alpha is defined as expected residual return (or risk-adjusted active return):
[5]  B P P P f f β − = α .
This return decomposition corresponds to the risk decomposition provided in equation [3]
above. Only if (portfolio) beta equals to one (or active beta equals to zero), alpha equals
active return as well as residual risk equals active risk. As shown in the case study, an active
beta arises due to structural positions. Hence, using only the information ratio (as defined by
investment practice) is not sufficient.
Interestingly, when tracing the origins of active portfolio management, in their 1973 article,
Treynor and Black proposed a three-stage procedure for the active management process: First,
construct an active (long/short) portfolio that is uncorrelated to the market portfolio and
maximizes information ratio. Second, combine this active portfolio in such a way with the
market portfolio so that the resulting portfolio exhibits a maximum Sharpe ratio. And third,
combine this portfolio and cash according to the investor’s risk aversion.
                                        
7  Using a Bayesian framework, Baks et al. (2001) show that even an extremely skeptical prior belief in active
managers’ skill will lead to an economically significant allocation to active funds.
8  See Fama (1970) and Fama (1991).
9  See Grinold/Kahn (1999), Ch. 5.12
Hence, the objective of (real) active management is to produce alpha, i.e. active return that is
uncorrelated to the benchmark return. Today, the investment practice focuses on the
requirement to maximize information ratio, but has neglected, as least partly, the other
requirements to produce an orthogonal active portfolio and to maximize the Sharpe ratio.
II. Implications for portfolio management
The analysis in section one has shown that structural positions should be avoided at all. The
implication for the management of a balanced fund is not to change the benchmark and to
keep away from structural positions by not overweighting equities in a permanent way (or,
not “too often”) to induce no equity bias. However, the question arises, how can a balanced
fund manager nevertheless do tactical asset allocation? The first part of this section proposes
how the investment process could be adapted in order to make tactical asset allocation work
in a proper way.
For the second example, the inclusion of credit in a portfolio with a government bond
benchmark, the implication is to replace the government benchmark by a broad benchmark
consisting of government and corporate bonds (if this consistent with investor’s preferences)
and then manage actively against this broad benchmark.
10 However, this might not be feasible
because the liquidity of the corporate bond market may not (yet) be sufficient and/or the
portfolio size may not be large enough.
11 In these cases, the corporate index (as part of the
broad index) cannot be replicated. The portfolio manager cannot achieve a neutral position
from which he could deviate according to his market views. The only way for the investor to
get a certain exposure to the credit market is to maintain the government benchmark but to
allow the manager to implement structural positions in credit, which will contribute to the
manager’s active return and active risk.
12 The manager has to decide which portion of the
                                        
10  Then the situation gets similar to the balanced fund example. When managing against a broad benchmark,
the fixed income manager should not permanently overweight corporate bonds, otherwise he again
introduces a structural position.
11  To replicate a corporate bond index, many more names must be included than in the case of a government
bond index in order to ensure adequate coverage to systematic sectors and qualities. Also corporate bonds
inherit much more specific risk (credit event risk) than government bonds, and specific risk can only be
eliminated (or at least reduced) by diversification. Due to transaction costs and minimum trade sizes,
diversification requires a minimum amount of at least 50 issuers, which in turn requires a certain minimum
portfolio size.
12  Another reason in the past for not replacing a government bond index by a broad index was that no adequate
broad indices existed (for Euroland). This has changed since the leading investment banks have expanded
their well-accepted bond indices to include spread products.13
overall available active risk – the active risk budget – he assigns to this structural decision.
13
In the second part of this section, we introduce risk budgeting techniques which provide a
solution to this problem.
1. Altering the investment process
Tactical asset allocation (TAA) is an important source of value added in a balanced fund. As
long as a manager has skill in TAA (i.e., positive real information ratio), he should do TAA.
(The general procedure for deriving how much active risk he should take in a decision field
like TAA is explained in the next section.) However, as section one has shown, shifting
between asset classes which have very different risk levels easily produces undesirable
structural positions. In practice, the TAA investment process is usually designed to compare
expected excess returns for bonds and equities and base TAA on these forecasts. As the
expected excess return for equities is higher than that for bonds in (far) more than 50% of all
cases, this will lead the manager to overweight equities more often than underweighting
equities. This, in turn, will produce a structural position.
To avoid this asymmetric outcome, the manager should compare his expected excess return
for equities to the equity equilibrium risk premium (or, market consensus).
14 If his forecast
exceeds the equilibrium risk premium, he should overweight equities (and finance this
overweight position out of cash, not out of bonds), otherwise he is advised to underweight
equities and build up cash. Ex ante, the probability for the expected excess return to exceed
the equilibrium risk premium is 50% (assuming a symmetric return distribution), so there is
no structural bias in this decision any more. The same procedure should be applied for the
bonds versus cash decision.
This procedure of basing TAA on (expected) deviations from equilibrium returns corresponds
to Grinold and Kahn’s approach for benchmark timing in a single asset class portfolio. For the
portfolio’s active beta, they show that the optimality condition holds:
                                        
13  In practice, the investor usually sets an upper limit for credit exposure (as well as lower bounds for rating
categories) in the investment guidelines, but leaves it up to the manager to determine the position size within
this range.
14  Of course, equilibrium risk premiums must be estimated, which introduces an additional source of estimation
risk. On the other hand, this estimation risk should not be too large and not larger than the estimation risk
associated with the manager’s forecasts of expected returns. The estimation of equity risk premiums has been
the subject of several studies; for recent studies see Pastor/Stambaugh (2000) and Jorion/Goetzmann (1999).14
[6]  2
B BT
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∆
= β ,
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where  BT λ  is the investor’s risk aversion to benchmark timing and
[7]  B B B f f µ − = ∆
is the difference between the manager’s forecast of benchmark (excess) return,  B f , and the
“usual” level of benchmark (excess) return,  B µ . If the manager expects that the asset class
will do better than usual, then he will increase beta, and vice versa. Again, the manager bases
his decision on comparing his forecast with the equilibrium return of the same asset class and
not on comparing it with the expected return on cash or any other asset class. Note that active
beta plays the same role in Grinold and Kahn’s concept of benchmark timing as in our
framework for TAA introduced in section one. An active beta that is positive on average
introduces a structural position. The exposure to systematic market risk is higher than what
the investor intended.
The next section introduces tools to perform an (active) risk decomposition. Structural
positions dominate the portfolio’s active risk level and composition if they are of considerable
size. Their contribution to tracking error variance will quickly get very large, especially when
they involve asset classes with very different risk levels, which is the case in TAA. Then there
is not enough risk budget left for the manager to demonstrate his skill in doing stock and bond
selection.
2. Using risk budgeting techniques to derive position sizes
In active management, there are several sources to add value. A global fixed income manager,
for instance, engages in duration management, yield curve management, country allocation,
currency allocation, and bond selection. All deviations from the benchmark in each of these
decision fields will contribute to the fund’s tracking error. However, active risk is a scarce
resource that must be employed efficiently because the investor sets a tracking error target,
which represents an upper bound for the manager.
 16
                                        
15  See Grinold/Kahn (1999), Ch. 19
16  From a theoretical standpoint, the optimal level of active risk taken by the manager should be determined by
the investor’s risk aversion and not by a fixed target (or target range) for active risk. Jacobs/Levy (1996)
explain how the loss in utility can be quantified by pursuing the latter strategy. However in investment
practice, it will often be easier for the investor to express the (maximum) level of active risk he is willing to
take than his risk aversion.15
Intuitively, the manager will assign a greater active risk budget to those decision fields, where
he has a higher confidence.
17 This confidence level will depend on the manager’s skill and
experience as well as to the underlying asset class and the degree of information efficiency.
18
The more value added he can generate with a certain decision field, the greater the risk budget
he will allocate to this decision field. As the various decisions are not perfectly correlated to
each other, he can make use of the power of diversification.
19 The portfolio information ratio
increases and he can generate a higher alpha for a given tracking error.
The procedure for deriving optimal risk budgets for various decision fields is to set up a
straightforward optimization problem that can be expressed in mathematical terms. Let  i IR
be the ex ante information ratio of decision field i (i=1...N),  i ψ  the active risk of decision
field i, and let λ represent the investor’s active risk aversion.
20  P α  is the fund’s active return
and  P ψ  its active risk. Value added, VA, is defined as
[8] 
2
P P VA λψ − α = .
Assume for the moment that the decision fields are uncorrelated to each other. Then,
ψ = ψ
i
2
i
2
P . To maximize VA, take the first partial derivative of VAwith respect to  i ψ .
This yields
[9] 
λ
= ψ
2
IRi *
i .
This equation clearly illustrates that only the information ratio is the relevant measure for
deriving risk budgets. The belief that seems to dominate in investment practice is to take
active risk in decisions (like the asset class decision in a balanced fund or the currency
allocation in a fixed income portfolio) which have a great impact on portfolio performance
due to the high volatility of the underlying assets. This turns out to be wrong.
                                        
17  In this section, we focus on active risk budgeting, as the budgeting of total risk is part of the strategic asset
allocation. One issue of total risk budgeting is for the investor to determine how much of total risk should be
assigned to active management. (Active management can be thought of as a separate asset class.)
18  Currencies, for instance, are very hard to predict. Hence, the (average) manager will not take too much risk in
active currency positions.
19  Correlations do not refer to correlations between asset classes here, as it is the case in Markowitz’s modern
portfolio theory, but to correlations between the active returns of the various decision fields. Hence the
diversification effect within the active risk budgeting framework is a different one from the usual
diversification effect when talking about asset allocation.
20  To differentiate between total and active risk aversion, Clarke et al. (1994) use the term regret aversion for
the latter. Regret aversion is generally much higher than total risk aversion.16
It is a first starting point to assume uncorrelated decision fields. As long as portfolio managers
use different information sets for different decisions, there is no reason to expect positive or
negative correlations. However, if they employ the same information set for certain decisions,
e.g. duration and yield curve decisions, correlations will be positive. Correlations can be
included in the optimization by introducing a N×N matrix ρ containing the correlations
between the decision fields. Let IR be the N×1 vector of the information ratios, ψ be the
N×1 vector of the tracking errors, σ be a N×N diagonal matrix with the tracking errors on the
diagonal, and 1 be a N×1 vector of ones. Then, equation [8] can be written in matrix notation:
[10]  1 1 R I VA σρσ ′ λ − ψ ′ = .
This objective function can be maximized using numerical algorithms.
Total tracking error variance, 
2
P ψ , can be decomposed into risk contributions, or
“contributions to active variance” (CAV). These CAVs represent the risk budgets; they sum
up to tracking error variance. The CAVs can be standardized by dividing through 
2
P ψ . This
gives the “absolute contributions to active variance” (ACAV). The N×1 vector of ACAVs can
be calculated as follows:
[11] 
2
P
1
ACAV
ψ
σρσ
= .
The risk budgeting approach can now be employed to derive the size of a structural position.
The essence is that a structural position represents a further decision field that is in
competition with the “traditional” decision fields (duration management, yield curve
strategies, ...). The higher the (structural) information ratio of the structural position compared
to the information ratios of the other decision fields, the more risk is allocated to the structural
position. The procedure is to first calculate the structural information ratio (as done in section
one), then perform the optimization. The optimization yields the optimal tracking error for the
structural position, and from this number and the covariance matrix, the position size can be
derived.
We illustrate this procedure with an example. Consider a fixed income manager with
information ratios of 0.30, 0.35, and 0.10 for duration management, yield curve strategies and
(government) bond selection (or relative value strategies), respectively. Duration and yield17
curve decisions are assumed to be correlated with 0.15. The structural information ratio for
credit is 0.25.
21 The optimization yields the risk budget distribution shown in figure 7.
Figure 7
Information Ratio Risk budget
Duration management 0.3 29.5%
Yield curve strategies 0.35 42.4%
Relative value strategies 0.1 3.9%
Structural credit position 0.25 24.3%
The largest risk budget is assigned to yield curve strategies, because it has the highest
information ratio. The structural credit position receives a portion of almost 25% of the fund’s
active risk budget. If the investor targets an overall tracking error of 120 bp, the tracking error
of the structural position amounts to 0.59%. By using the covariance matrix V (covariances
between the government and the corporate sector), the optimal position size amounts to 35%.
Hence, by allocating 35% of the portfolio into corporate bonds, the fund manager maximizes
the portfolio information ratio.
 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the link between the frameworks of total risk/total return and
active risk/active return in the context of structural positions, which is a highly relevant topic
in investment practice. Structural positions have disadvantageous effects for the investor. We
have shown implications for portfolio construction and have derived techniques that can
provide solutions.
Besides portfolio construction, the analysis has important implications for performance
evaluation. In investment practice, many sponsors compare their managers (who are given the
same benchmark) only on the basis of (realized) active returns,  PA r.
22 Managers are not only
judged against their benchmarks but also against their peers. These one-dimensional rankings
                                        
21  Due to the longer available return history, the structural information ratio is based on US data. It is derived
by using monthly return data from 3/1989 to 3/2001 for the Lehman US Corporate and the JPMorgan USA
bond indices.
22  r denotes realized returns in contrast to the symbol f which represents expected (excess) returns (as used, for
example, in equation [5]).18
are not very helpful to prevent managers from taking structural positions. In contrast, the
opposite effect is true: They encourage or sometimes even force managers to engage in
structural positions and do not reward efforts to produce alpha.
23
Recently, more sponsors have recognized the drawbacks of simple manager rankings and
amend the rankings by (realized) active risk and (realized) information ratios,  P PA r ψ .
However, as shown here, these measures (as defined in investment practice) are not able to
detect structural positions. Hence, the investor is advised to go even further in order to ensure
that the manager’s strategy fulfills what the investor wants him to do (and pays him for): to
produce excess returns uncorrelated to the benchmark and hence to shift the investor’s
efficient frontier outwards.
24
                                        
23  For instance, when all managers from the peer group managing a global fixed income portfolio with a world
government benchmark do not allocate any JGBs, a single manager is more or less forced to also take this
structural position.
24  This will of course increase the monitoring costs of the investor. If he is not willing to spend this effort, he is
better advised to employ only single asset class managers and no balanced managers and to do the TAA by
himself (or hire a single TAA overlay manager).19
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